COTE D?IVOIRE:
UN Investigation Report on the March 25 Massacre
Laurent Gbagbo Accountable for Massive Human Rights Violation
GENEVA, 29 APRIL 2004 (Abstracts)
72. What happened on 25 and 26 March was the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians and the
committing of massive human rights violations. The march became a pretext for what turned out to be a
carefully planned and executed operation by the security forces, i.e,. the police, the gendarmerie, the
army, as well as special units and the so-called parallel forces, under the direction and responsibility of the
highest authorities of the State. This conclusion is the result of accounts from eyewitnesses and survivors
as well as corroborating evidence collected in Abidjan from 13 to 28 April 2004.
76. While a "red zone" had been declared, within which unauthorized personnel would be considered as
enemy combatants and shot on sight, the security forces had positioned themselves in and around the
areas where the events occurred, i.e. the periphery of Abidjan, in advance of the march, allegedly also
blocking the entry or exit of residents, and carried out their action there for two days, and probably
longer, outside the reach of international military forces present in Côte d`Ivoire or of independent
international observers.
35. What actually happened on 25 March and afterwards was the indiscriminate killing of innocent
civilians by the security forces. There is overwhelming evidence which suggests that these killings were
mostly unprovoked and unnecessary to deal with the demonstrators. In addition, it is also evident that
certain community groups were specially targeted, i.e. individuals from the north of the country or from
neighbouring countries (especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) who were subjected to major violations
of human rights, including summary and extra judicial execution, torture, arbitrary detention and
disappearance, that had little or nothing to do with the march.
36. The political responsibility of those who had planned the march, in spite of the ban and the tense
climate created by the drawing of a "red zone" and the mobilization and use of the army and statements
made by the highest authority of the State, must also be dearly emphasized. The political leaders who had
asked for the march to take place must have realized that it would be too risky, and they did not
participate. Their political responsibility, however, cannot be in any way comparable to the actions of the
security forces and the massive violations of human rights they committed.
37. The size of the military and security forces in place and the bellicose tone on the part of officials and
the press, including a statement made on 24 March by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Gen.
Mathias Doué, that the Security forces would inflict the punishment deserved by those "who had
understood nothing", all seemed to prepare the public for a major operation, one that in reality turned out
to be a hard lesson for the demonstrators and the groups targeted by the security forces.
38. Indeed, while the march was presented to the public, and possibly perceived by some, as a major
security challenge to the nation and its President, all available evidence suggests that there was no
significant threat to the security forces posed by the demonstrators, who were not armed and there was
no reported infiltration from the north, or any attempts at an insurrection by the population against the
State. Credible witnesses` accounts attest to the fact that those who were determined to venture onto the
streets in order to demonstrate intended to challenge the ban on marches, since that had already happened
with no consequences when the Young Patriots demonstrated in December 2003 during a previous ban,
and to show a public display of political support for G7.
39. There were tanks, armed personnel carriers and rocket-propelled launchers pre-positioned in certain
areas of Abidjan. There were helicopters and units of the navy mobilized on those days. There were
thousands of men in uniform and so-called parallel forces manning the mobile units using jeeps, 4x4
vehicles and heavy armoured trucks, who often received instructions from the air and who targeted
primarily the community groups described above.
40. Although a "red zone" had been declared, the security forces positioned themselves in and around the
periphery of Abidjan, far from that zone, in advance of the march, blocking the entry or exit of residents in
especially sensitive areas such as Abobo. They carried out their actions for two days, and probably
longer, without allowing international military forces present in Côte d`Ivoire or independent international
observers or the press to have access to record the events.
41. All available evidence suggests that the initial shooting that started the indiscriminate `killings in the
morning of 25 March was the result of coordinated action by the security forces. Consistent accounts
from various eyewitnesses at different locations on the periphery of Abidjan attest to the launching of tear
gas canisters, the use of live ammunition and shooting, either in the air or directly at demonstrators, by
security forces in the early hours of 25 March, i.e. between 6.15 and 7.00 a.m.
42. Before the security forces began their action, those who managed to get to the streets saw that no one
had yet begun marching or was behaving in a threatening or provocative manner. There were reports of
discussions between would-be demonstrators and the security forces, in some cases face to face.
43. According to statistics gathered by the Commission of Inquiry on the basis of official and other
documents received, (?) at least 120 people were killed, 274 wounded and 20 disappeared, These
figures are by no means final. They represent the best available information the Commission was able to
gather on this difficult element of the inquiry within the time available. On that premise, the largest number
of victims was from Abobo: 63 per cent of the deaths, 35 per cent of the wounded or tortured and 40 per
cent of the disappeared. The second largest number of victims was from Anyama, with 10 per cent of the
deaths; Koumassi accounted for 13 per cent of the wounded or tortured and 35 per cent of the
disappeared were from Anyama. It should also be noted that 80 per cent of the victims were men and that
the Commission could not verify any allegation or report of rape.
44. It is equally clear that many of the killings on these two days did not take place in the street but in the
dwellings of would-be demonstrators or even innocent civilians targeted by the security forces simply
because of their name, origin or community group. It was a well- known fact that police officers or other
security officials or parallel forces [armed militia including: Young Patriots (Jeunes patriotes), Groupement
patriotique pour la paix now called Force de libération nationale, Fédération d`étudiants et stagiaires de
Côte d`Ivoire (FESCI), Forces armées territoriales and/or Forces anti-terroristes (FAT), and Union des
patriotes pour la libération totale de la Cote d`Ivoire (UPLTCI) that are not formally within the structure
of the armed forces or security services, but these groups normally support the work of the police and the
gendarmerie and, at times, and are used as alternatives to them] would harass, try to rob, or search and
arrest without warrants people in Abidjan even in the days preceding 25 March. However, these activities
had greatly intensified since 23 March and contributed to the explosive environment. Credible accounts
received by the Commission indicate that these actions too had been planned and directed by the security
forces and later executed in cooperation and collusion with the parallel forces.
46. Credible reports indicate that within the security services and the leadership of the parallel forces it
was known that force would be used; that people would be killed on 25 March.
47. Based on accounts received from eyewitnesses, and as indicated in public statements by the Director
General of the Police, the security forces were already prepositionned in the early morning of 25 March in
several key areas of Abidjan, namely Abobo, Adjamé, Yopougon, Anyama, and Kumassi. The defensive
structure was composed of three main elements: fixed units made up of heavy equipment, tanks, armoured
personnel carriers and rocket-propelled launchers in order to contain, demonstrators in the peripheral
areas, mobile units manned by special forces of the police, the gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard;
and the armed forces as an element of overall defence.
48. According to accounts received from the G7 organizers, the demonstrators who wanted to march
were told to regroup in large public areas within their communes on their way towards the Plateau of
Abidjan, the "red zone". The rendezvous point was the Place de la République, just outside the zone.
Their idea was to hold a peaceful sit-in there. They did not intend to cross or challenge the red zone, In
some areas of the periphery, would-be demonstrators were forced to stay at home and could not regroup
with other demonstrators in the streets. In other areas, including in Abobo and Adjamé, demonstrators
managed to get to the streets and to start the process of regrouping at key points for their intended march
towards the Plateau.
49. In some quarters, such as Port Bouet 2 (Yopougon) and Abobo, the shooting started early in the
morning, between 6.15 and 8.30, immediately after tear gas canisters were launched by helicopters and
by the security forces on the ground. As a result of the tear gas and the shouting and the shooting by the
security forces, the crowd became panicked and disorderly. The demonstrators began to run back to their
homes or other safe places, in fear of their lives. The use of the helicopters allowed mobile forces to be
directed to where the crowd would attempt to regroup so as to reinforce the position of security forces in
place on the ground.
50. In one incident, in Yopougon, at 6.15 a.m., as demonstrators were trying to gather in the street, a jeep
with English-Speaking uniformed men, without insignias, threatened to kill them. A few minutes later,
helicopters began to fly so low over the area that demonstrators could see the white pilots being assisted
by black men. Tear gas canisters were dropped from the helicopters onto the crowd. As the tear gas
spread through the streets, the crowd began to flee. The men without insignias, possibly members of the
parallel forces, blocked the road with the jeep and made it impossible for the demonstrators to get away.
Meanwhile, police and officers of the gendarmerie arrived at the scene and the shooting started. It was not
clear to the eyewitnesses who actually shot at them: the parallel forces", the police or the gendarmerie.
However, several demonstrators were hit and killed at about 7 a.m. One wounded man was taken by the
driver of a passing car who attempted to take him to a nearby hospital. On the way, he was stopped and
arrested by the police, who threw the wounded men by the side of the road.
51. In the area called Adjamé, not too far from Abobo, towards the Plateau, at about 10 a.m. a group of
demonstrators were dispersed by tear gas canisters launched from helicopters. The gas created confusion
among the demonstrators, who started to run in different directions or attempted to go back home or take
cover in nearby houses. One member of the parallel forces, wearing a white T-shirt and accompanied by
three police officers, is reported to have shot at the fleeing demonstrators. Two of them were wounded,
but managed to survive thanks to assistance provided by the Red Cross.
52. People were thus killed or wounded on the street, in courtyards as well as inside their own homes.
Bodies were collected by vehicles of the security forces or funeral cars and brought either to public or
private morgues in the Abidjan area. According to the Commission`s findings, there are currently still 81
bodies in mortuaries. At the time this report was written, the State forensic pathologist had carried out
some 50 autopsies at the mortuary at the University Hospital of Treichville. He said that pathologists were
asked to do the remaining autopsies at the mortuary of Anyama.. However, there were only four forensic
pathologists available so finishing the job would require more time, especially as they did not have all the
necessary equipment.
53. Other bodies might have been transported and buried elsewhere, in what. are likely to be mass
graves. There are credible accounts by eyewitnesses and other sources received by the Commission that
allege the existence of at least two mass graves, at N`Dotre and Akouedo. These claims, however, will
have to be independently verified, as the Commission was not in a position to do so within the time
available, especially given the likely number of deaths (138), and the disappearances, conservatively
estimated to be at least 20. In addition to the 81 bodies in mortuaries, there are some 77 bodies which at
present cannot be accounted for.
54. Wounded people were left to themselves and to the care; of their relatives, friends, or others who
tried to bring them to hospital or provide urgent medical attention or first aid. There have been reports that
Red Cross personnel and cars were seen at the scene of the events and in some cases were involved in
assisting the wounded.
Use of helicopters
55. According to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, helicopters were used on 25 and 26 March in
order to take aerial photographs or to assist in the urgent evacuation of personnel. According to credible
accounts from various eyewitnesses, helicopters were used both for observation and for aerial support to
the mobile units of the security forces on the ground by launching tear gas canisters or directing
reinforcements to specific locations. In one instance, helicopters were reported as flying very low at
around 10 a.m. in the area of Port Bouet. where there were no demonstrators at that time. Many
witnesses reported that, after a first pass above a courtyard, a helicopter came back and shot at people
and dropped three explosive devices, as a result of which two people were killed, including a 12-year-old
child, and more than 15 wounded.
III CONCLUSIONS
An immediate end to the cycle of violence and to impunity is indispensable in order to move the country
out of the present crisis and towards the establishment of the rule of law and respect for human rights,
which are crucial for peace and successful and sustainable development efforts over the long term.
77. There are also credible reports that more than, 20 people could have disappeared whose families are
too afraid to report their disappearance to the relevant authorities.
78. The killing of two policemen, which exacerbated the tensions in the street and provided a semblance
of justification for the strong reaction by the security forces, actually took place two or three hours after
the security forces had already started shooting into the crowds. Thus, most of the human rights violations
that occurred on these two day can be characterized as a massacre in which summary executions, torture,
disappearances and arbitrary detentions were repeatedly committed by units of the security forces and the
parallel forces acting in coordination or in collusion, with them
82. More generally, -it is important to emphasise that current problems in Côte d`Ivoire cannot be
addressed or solved through coups d`état or violence nor through continuing impunity for massive human
rights violations, but through political dialogue, stability, and economic and social development.. Equally
relevant is the question of reducing the uneven distribution of wealth, the systematic exclusion, of
community groups and the low level of literacy which, compounded by unemployment, especia1ly among
the youth, create a breeding ground for intolerance and extremism. Thus, the events in question can be
better understood by bearing in mind the realities of Côte d`Ivoire since the early 1990s and issues
relevant to good governance and the rule of law such as elections, political parties, national identity and
land tenure.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
84. Criminal investigations before an independent court should be carried out with a view to prosecuting
those responsible for the indiscriminate killings on 25 and 26 March, i.e. the commanders of the special
units involved within the security forces of Côte d`Ivoire, as well as the so-called parallel forces.
85. Any other persons who may have been involved within these forces In the direction and planning of
the 25 and 26 March indiscriminate killings should also be prosecuted and/or disciplined. This should be
done in accordance with other evidence or findings that will emerge through the work of the International
Commission of Inquiry foreseen in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.
87. Thus, individual accountability for the massive human rights violations committed on those days in
March by the highest authorities of the State is essential to restoring faith in the institutions of the State
itself and must be a priority for the international community, especially within the context of the United
Nations Security Council.
89. In particular, especially after the public release of this report, It is necessary for the international
community to consider expanding the mandate of ONUCI to ensure the protection of witnesses to the
indiscriminate killings of2S March, especially those individuals and groups that provided confidentially
valuable information to the Commission for the elaboration of the present report and the protection of
relatives of victims of the indiscriminate killings, tile families of the disappeared, as well as the survivors.
93. The Government of Côte d`Ivoire should also be urged to put an immediate end to arrests and
searches carried out during the night.
94. Since the existence of militias and so-called parallel forces has been ascertained, the President of the
Republic and the Government of National Reconciliation have the obligation to take all necessary steps to
put an end to their activities.
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